NASA-UAP-D028, Débriefing médical d'équipage Apollo 17, 1972

[00:00] Debrief opens reviewing the LM ascent from the lunar surface and rendezvous checklist: power-up and launch prep 'went nominal,' pyros fired normally, no lost RCS/propellant valves. [01:04] Shortly after liftoff the crew lost S-band uplink (though downlink continued) — traced to a Goldstone ground-station dropout right around the time of the CSI/insertion burn. For the first two to three minutes the CDR called out altitudes and guidance cues 'in the blind' while the LMP worked to regain comm; described as 'a very inopportune time' since it hit right after ignition. [02:23] Insertion trajectory was nominal; the AGS out-of-plane tweak burn was about 7 ft/s (X: -4, Y: -9, Z: +1), burned in that order. A possible small drift in the PGNS Y-accelerometer was suspected but never affected tracking or rendezvous, which the CDR calls one of the most nominal rendezvous profiles he has flown. [03:34] Rendezvous navigation followed the checklist; rendezvous radar and AGS auto-updates performed well. At TPI, the residuals were larger than expected (about -7 ft/s in X, roughly 4-and-something in Y and Z) and were nulled to under 0.2 ft/s; tracking continued nominally through the mid-courses. [04:49] Comm after the initial dropout was good. A few minutes after insertion the CMP zeroed out an accumulated ~1.5 ft/s bias on the X-accelerometer (a 'zero cal' he performed without checking with the ground, believing it was within his discretion); no further significant drift followed. [05:30] AGS and PGNS TPI solutions agreed within 2-3 ft/s after six marks; the AGS insertion solution was off by several ft/s in X and more in Z. Mark counts and PGNS recycle/final solutions are noted as differing slightly from the number called out in the checklist, with more detail left in the crew's data-card book. [06:32] Mid-course 1: AGS out-of-plane ran a little high, so the crew burned the onboard PGNS solution (-1.2, +0.4, +0.3 ft/s) instead. Mid-course 2: AGS out-of-plane was again high (opposite direction from PGNS) and the CSM solution showed an unexplained +5.4 ft/s in Z, so correlation between CSM and LM solutions was poor; the crew again burned the PGNS onboard solution (-0.4, -0.7, -1.6 ft/s) and rode the nominal braking gates in with only about 6-7 ft/s trimmed at the one-mile gate. This was followed by formation flying and a visual inspection of the CSM/SIM bay before docking. [09:13] Docking: the LM ascent stage 'dead-banded' noticeably more than the S-IVB target had on the previous mission. First contact was made at very low closing rate (well under 0.1 ft/s) but capture did not occur; the CDR backed off a few feet, renulled rates, and re-closed to capture. Once captured, both vehicles going 'CMC free' simultaneously caused each to perturb the other's rates, so the crew put the LM into attitude hold while the CSM nulled rates; hard dock then went smoothly and 'quicker' than the earlier docking, without the ripple-fire feel of the first attempt. [11:25] Visual sighting during rendezvous (LMP): the sunlit CM was identifiable by eye from the LM at roughly 100 miles. After the CM passed into darkness, its rendezvous/tracking light could not be picked up again until the LM closed to within about 40 miles, appearing first as a very dim, faint flash. The LMP also describes confirming the LM's own tracking light was working by watching it reflect off the underside of an EVA handrail, and by watching it produce a sequential flash off small debris particles that had stayed with the spacecraft — this is a description of the onboard strobe tracking light, not the light-flash phenomenon discussed later. [12:57] CMP notes on optical visibility of the LM through the CSM's optics (already logged elsewhere), plus extensive 16 mm and Hasselblad photography of the LM, the rendezvous, and earlier lunar-surface activity. [13:52] Post-docking / pre-LM-jettison: both pilots kept their helmets on through rendezvous and docking mainly to keep lunar dust out. The CDR removed his gloves almost immediately after insertion and flew the whole rendezvous that way; the LMP kept gloves on longer, into the transfer, then removed them; the CDR kept his helmet on throughout rendezvous and docking, removing it only once hard-docked. Removing the helmet in the dust-laden LM caused eye and mouth irritation; sweeping loose floor dust into low points and taping over them beforehand is credited with reducing the problem significantly. [16:24] LM-to-CM transfer: the LMP prepared gear in the LM while the CDR worked the tunnel passing items through; inventory was cross-checked from both ends. Suits were vacuumed and items bagged/zipped before transfer and never reopened, so despite heavy dust throughout the LM cabin, very little made it into the Command Module, which the crew found remained a 'totally refreshed, unpolluted atmosphere' even with the CDR's helmet off in the LM. Running a vacuum cleaner in the LM is credited with keeping airflow (and dust) moving away from the tunnel. [19:24] Suit-up and integrity checks followed a slower-than-simulated tunnel venting; the CMP estimates it took three to four times longer than in the simulator, a finding flagged as relevant to Skylab. Tunnel closeout was easy since no drogue or probe had to be handled (both were stowed in the LM ahead of jettison). [20:20] LM jettison was watched and photographed; the SEP burn (P41) was executed a little late but cleanly by nulling the residuals in P41. [21:09] The crew again emphasizes how clean the Command Module stayed relative to the dust-covered LM, crediting the bag-and-zip transfer procedure. [22:22] [Audio quality degrades for roughly two minutes — a repeated, likely mistranscribed phrase about suit-zipper sealing technique; no new technical content recoverable.] [24:48] Water was found condensed on suit hardware and ECS lines by the next EVA day (suits and PGA bags were noticeably damp); the crew recommends wiping the LEB/ECS area dry before or after burns as standard procedure going forward. [26:10] TEI note: unlike the simulator, the spacecraft's roll rate oscillated back and forth across the roll deadband (around 0.4 deg/s) during the TEI burn rather than settling to one side. [26:59] Trans-Earth coast, systems: the in-flight chlorination device leaked small to moderate amounts of water/chlorine on almost every use, traced to the barrel of the chlorine-ampoule dispenser itself rather than its fittings; handling it required frequent hand-cleaning and occasional tissue clean-up. The CDR subsequently peeled skin from his right hand, which the crew attributes to chlorine exposure rather than the EVA. [30:23] Passive thermal control required unusual attitudes (tied to instrument/experiment pointing needs), forcing repeated re-maneuvering in and out of PTC, often near gimbal lock. This shifted the spacecraft's thermal equilibrium enough to visibly change condensation patterns — the center tunnel hatch became 'soaking wet' on the second day home — and the cabin ran colder than expected, addressed by adding an extra inverter and switching to manual temperature control. [33:35] Deep-space (transearth) EVA by the CMP to retrieve film cassettes from the SIM bay: preparation followed the checklist closely and stayed on timeline; about 30 minutes were lost to a communications-carrier change. Afterward the crew got ahead on entry stowage and general cabin housekeeping. [35:38] Minor procedural change to the order of suit donning/doffing (CDR first in, LMP and CMP last) worked out well; suits were stowed in the L-shaped bag before the center couch was reinstalled. [37:12] Cabin depress and hatch opening: even reading zero cabin pressure, residual pressure (partly from the suits continuously bleeding into the cabin) pulled the hatch out of the CDR's hand; the CDR notes the same effect occurred on the lunar surface. Small debris, ice crystals, and loose items (including a lost pair of scissors nobody actually saw exit) floated out through the open hatch. [39:18] Egress: with the hatch counterbalance disconnected and locked open, the CMP had to consciously duck to clear the OPS backpack past the main display console on the way out. [40:00] TV camera and data-acquisition camera (DAC) mounting on the outside pole worked well; the CMP couldn't see the camera's indicator light but could feel it running once switched on. [40:46] Retrieval of the lunar-sounder and panoramic-camera film cassettes from the SIM bay went smoothly, though the heavier pan-camera cassette required careful, slow handling once moving; SIM-bay visual inspection itself is covered on the air-to-ground transcript. [42:18] TV/DAC removal and repositioning: the CMP pointed the camera at the Moon (no sun-glare concern) then tried to aim more precisely at the distant Earth; doing so one-handed while also holding position caused him to lose body control, so he gave up on fine-aiming toward Earth rather than risk drifting into the sun's glare. [43:25] EVA communications were loud and clear throughout, with background hissing from suit airflow; lowering the voice-activated mic sensitivity by a couple of notches earlier in the flight is credited with improving audio quality. [44:27] Ingress felt easier than egress. Closing the hatch was harder than expected — likely because suit exhaust kept it from fully seating until manually pulled the last inch before the latching handle could engage; cabin repressurization was nominal. [45:23] General EVA technique comments: moving slowly and in small increments, using a partner to push/pull on a tether at hatch or port operations, and never lacking a way to control body position once braced on the structure. The CMP describes a recurring 90-degree disorientation on returning inside each time, resolving within a few seconds; sun angle made fine visual work difficult (though gross tasks were unaffected); and he reports no physical awareness at all of the oxygen umbilical on his back — no drag, tangling, or restriction, aside from possibly one minor clearing of it from a handhold. [48:27] Suit drying and storage is noted as already covered elsewhere in the debrief. [48:46] Light flash phenomena: a crew member reports on the formal light-flash observation trial — roughly an hour with the eyes covered ('blindfolded') — during which he never saw a light flash at all. This was the second such formal session, conducted on the way home during trans-Earth coast, specifically trying to observe the phenomenon. Moving to the next checklist item, 'eating, resting, exercise,' a crew member adds a follow-up comment on the light flashes: that same evening, he says, while falling asleep, 'I did see them again' — and a second crew member immediately confirms, 'so did I.' The group notes this as a distinct pattern: there was just that one bounded period, during the actual formal experiment, when — for some reason — the flashes 'weren't there,' even though two of the three crewmen reported seeing them on other occasions such as while falling asleep. [49:27] Moving on: the waste-storage compartment's vent was never really used to clear odors; a smell was noticeable mainly near the compartment or right when its door was opened. Cabin air handled occasional gas buildup well, fully recirculating and clearing within a few minutes. [50:39] Flight-plan updates were minimal and well managed; almost nothing in the plan changed beyond a few times, dates, and attitudes. [50:58] Entry preparations began right after the EVA and continued into the next day, with very little final stowage left for entry morning beyond securing a few equipment bags. The crew ran about five minutes ahead of the checklist through separation and CM RCS activation. [51:38] Communications through entry were good via ARIA coverage into and out of blackout; the ground could hear the crew continuously, and although ARIA could still have relayed traffic in the brief window right after blackout, nothing further was actually passed. [52:13] The 0.05G roll check, horizon, and sunset cues all occurred within seconds of predicted times. One crew member notes he never actually noticed the 'quarter light' go out as expected, guessing he was occupied watching the entry monitor system (EMS) instead. [53:09] Recording breaks off here (blank audio) mid-checklist during entry procedures; the debrief continues in NASA-UAP-D029.