CIA-UAP-002, Comitato consultivo scientifico sugli oggetti volanti non identificati, Rapporto, 1952-1953

[PAGE 2] Federal Civil Defense Administration, Washington 25, D.C., Office of the Administrator. Letter to Mr. Richard D. Drain, Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee: acknowledges careful study of 'Report of the Panel of Scientific Consultants' on UFOs; notes the Panel's conclusions and recommendations, particularly on public education, are of considerable interest to the civil defense program; requests a conference to discuss implementation. Signed, Val Peterson. [PAGE 4] 13 March 1953. Letter from Richard D. Drain, Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee, to the Secretary of Defense: forwards the attached panel report on Unidentified Flying Objects, convened at the direction of General [Walter Bedell] Smith following the IAC's recommendation; notes the conclusions point to potential national security dangers and suggest remedies; states CIA does not consider 'flying saucer' sightings primarily its concern but offers to assist; copies also sent to the [Federal Civil Defense Administration] and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board. [PAGE 5] 13 March 1953. Similar letter to the Honorable Val Peterson, Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration, forwarding the same report. [PAGE 6] 12 March 1953. Letter from Richard D. Drain to Mr. C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President, The White House: forwards, at the request of Robert Amory Jr. (Assistant Deputy Director/Intelligence), the enclosed 'Report of the Scientific Panel on Unidentified Flying Objects,' dated January 17, 1953, prepared by a panel convened at the direction of former DCI Gen. Walter B. Smith. [PAGE 7] Distribution list for the form letter: Robert Cutler; C.D. Jackson (White House); James S. Lay (Executive Secretary, National Security Council); George Morgan and Tracy Barnes (Psychological Strategy Board). [PAGES 8-9] REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC PANEL ON UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS, 17 January 1953 (formal report). 1. Pursuant to the request of the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, the undersigned Panel of Scientific Consultants met to evaluate any possible threat to national security posed by Unidentified Flying Objects ('Flying Saucers'), based on evidence from ATIC and a review of best-documented incidents. 2. Conclusions: (a) evidence shows no indication these phenomena constitute a direct physical threat to national security; no residuum of cases indicates foreign artifacts capable of hostile acts; no evidence indicates a need to revise current scientific concepts. 3. Further, continued emphasis on reporting these phenomena, in these perilous times, itself constitutes a threat to the orderly functioning of the protective organs of government -- clogging communication channels with irrelevant reports, risking that real indications of hostile action might be ignored amid false alarms, and cultivating a national psychology vulnerable to skillful hostile propaganda inducing hysterical behavior and distrust of authority. 4. Recommendations: (a) national security agencies should strip UFOs of their special status and aura of mystery; (b) institute intelligence, training, and public education policies to prepare material defenses and public morale to recognize and react to true indications of hostile intent, via an integrated program reassuring the public of the lack of evidence for hostile forces, training personnel to quickly recognize and reject false indications, and strengthening evaluation channels for true indications. Signed: Lloyd V. Berkner (Associated Universities, Inc.), H.P. Robertson (Chairman, California Institute of Technology), S.A. Goudsmit (Brookhaven National Laboratories), Luis W. Alvarez (University of California), Thornton Page (Johns Hopkins University). [PAGES 10-11] TAB B -- EVIDENCE PRESENTED: (1) 75 case histories of sightings 1951-1952 (ATIC-selected, best documented); (2) ATIC status/progress reports of Project GRUDGE and Project BLUE BOOK; (3) progress reports of Project STORK (Battelle Memorial Institute contract supporting ATIC); (4) summary report of sightings at Holloman AFB, New Mexico; (5) USAF Research Center, Cambridge report on 'Green Fireball' investigation (Project TWINKLE); (6) outline of investigation proposed by Kirtland AFB (Project [something]); (7) motion picture films of sightings at Tremonton, Utah (2 July 1952) and Great Falls, Montana (August 1950); (8) summary report of 89 selected cases (formations, blinking lights, hovering, etc.); (9) draft manual 'How to Make a UFOB Report,' prepared at ATIC; (10) chart of geographic locations of unexplained U.S. sightings, 1952; (11) chart of balloon-launching sites in the U.S.; (12) charts of balloon flight paths vs. reported sightings; (13) charts of sighting-report frequency, 1948-1952; (14) charts of sighting explanation categories; (15) Kodachrome transparencies of polyethylene balloons in sunlight showing high reflectivity; (16) motion picture of seagulls showing high reflectivity; (17) intelligence reports on USSR interest in U.S. sightings; (18) samples of official reporting forms and military orders; (19) sample polyethylene 'pillow' balloon (54-inch square); (20) 'Variations in Radar Coverage' (JANAP 101); (21) miscellaneous official letters and foreign intelligence reports; (22) copies of popular published works on the subject. [PAGES 12-13] TAB C -- MEMBERS: Dr. H.P. Robertson (Chairman, Caltech); Dr. Luis W. Alvarez (Univ. of California); Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner (Associated Universities/Brookhaven); Dr. S.A. Goudsmit (Office of Research Operations, Johns Hopkins). ASSOCIATE MEMBERS: Dr. J. Allen Hynek (Ohio State University); Mr. Frederick C. Durant (Arthur D. Little, Inc.). INTERVIEWED: Brig. Gen. William M. Garland (Commanding General, ATIC); Dr. H. Marshall Chadwell (Assistant Director, OSI, CIA); Mr. Ralph L. Clark (Deputy Assistant Director, OSI, CIA); also Lt. Philip Goodstrong, Capt. Edward J. Ruppelt (USAF), Mr. Fournet (aeronautical engineer/BLUEBOOK Project Officer), Lt. R.S. Neasham, and Navy Photo Interpretation Laboratory (Anacostia) personnel. [PAGE 14] IAC-D-67, 18 February 1953. Intelligence Advisory Committee memo transmitting the panel report (Tab A), evidence summary (Tab B), and personnel list (Tab C); proposes transmittal to the Secretary of Defense, FCDA Director, and NSRB Chairman; states results moved CIA to conclude no NSC Intelligence Directive on the subject is warranted. Signed James Q. Reber, Secretary. [Handwritten distribution/release notations to Cutler, Lay, Jackson, Barnes, Morgan.] [PAGE 15] REPORT OF MEETINGS OF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL ON UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS, convened by Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA, January 14-18, 1953. F.C. Durant [author of minutes]. [PAGES 17-33] PART II -- COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS OF PANEL (detailed minutes, substantially paralleling content also found in document DOW-UAP-D092's appendix): discussion of case histories (Bellefontaine, Ohio; Tremonton, Utah; Great Falls, Montana; Yaak, Montana; Washington D.C.; Haneda AFB, Japan; Port Huron, Michigan; Presque Isle, Maine) and about 15 others; conclusion that reasonable explanations could be suggested for most sightings; reference to Charles Fort's writings on 'strange things in the sky'; unanimous conclusion of no evidence of direct threat to national security; discussion of unexplained WWII 'Foo Fighter' phenomena (possibly electrostatic/St. Elmo's-fire-like or ice-crystal light reflections); note that Robertson and Alvarez both leaned toward categorizing certain cases as probable 'Foo Fighters,' unexplained but not dangerous. ARTIFACTS OF EXTRATERRESTRIAL ORIGIN: no Panel member ruled out eventual extraterrestrial visitation, but no evidence tied sighted objects to space travelers; Mr. Fournet's presentation (elimination method leaving 'extra-terrestrial' as the remaining explanation in some cases) was not accepted by the Panel as the reports were raw and unevaluated; Dr. Goudsmit held such artifacts, if real, would simply be new subjects for scientific study; Dr. Robertson disagreed, believing such artifacts would be of immediate concern to all countries; Dr. Page considered intelligent extraterrestrial life elsewhere in the solar system extremely unlikely. TREMONTON, UTAH SIGHTING: detailed analysis of the Kodachrome film (~1,600 frames, ~1,000 man-hours of Navy Photo Interpretation Lab analysis); P.I.L. concluded objects were self-luminous, not birds/balloons/aircraft/reflections; the Panel disagreed for multiple technical reasons (semi-spherical objects can produce non-blinking reflections through 60 degrees of arc; apparent motion/brightness patterns strongly suggested birds, especially after viewing a film of seagulls showing high reflectivity in sunlight; the 'circular bluish-white' color description was consistent with specular sunlight reflection off convex surfaces; Great Falls case objects were likely birds/aircraft reflections; questioned the validity of P.I.L.'s light-intensity measurement methodology, noting it used duplicate rather than original film, with the original having a lighter background reducing relative object brightness; no data existed on Kodachrome film sensitivity at varying light intensities). The Panel concluded that further controlled experiments (photographing polyethylene 'pillow' balloons under similar conditions) would likely explain the sighting, but that the cost of following up every one of the roughly 1,900 sightings reported annually (1952 figure) could not be justified; the 'burden of proof is on the sighter, not the explainer.' POTENTIAL RELATED DANGERS: agreement that the largest dangers were misidentification of actual enemy artifacts by defense personnel, overloading of emergency reporting channels with false information, and psychological vulnerability to enemy propaganda. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS: examination of an ATIC map of 1952 unexplained sightings showed clusters near certain strategic/sensitive areas (e.g. Los Alamos), potentially explained by heightened local vigilance, though the Panel found no comprehensive explanation for the clustering pattern and noted foreign-origin artifacts would more logically be first observed near foreign borders rather than the central U.S. INSTRUMENTATION: skepticism that ATIC's plan to distribute 100 inexpensive stereo cameras to airport control towers would yield much useful data, though it might help ease public concern; discussion of Project TWINKLE's poor year-long results; discussion of enlisting amateur astronomers (Hynek) and wide-angle sky-patrol cameras (Page), noting extensive existing astronomical sky-patrol programs at Harvard (Whipple), Yerkes Observatory/Fort Davis, Texas (Meinel, Kuiper, Morgan), University of Alaska (Elvey), Dominion Observatory Ottawa (Millman), Palomar Observatory (Minkowski), and Lick Observatory (Shane) had never captured a striking unidentified object. RADAR MUTUAL INTERFERENCE: discussion of radar 'phantom' tracks caused by cross-station pulse interference, with Dr. Berkner proposing a 'Doppler filter' solution and Dr. Alvarez proposing a simpler/cheaper 'controlled jitter' technique. UNEXPLAINED COSMIC RAY PHENOMENA: two cited cases (Palomar Mountain, October 1949, and Los Alamos 'Bird Watchers Association' observations, Aug 1950-Jan 1951) were determined by Dr. Alvarez to be instrumental artifacts, not correlated with UFOs. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM: a two-pronged 'training' and 'debunking' program was proposed, tailored to different personnel levels (radar operators, pilots, control tower operators, Ground Observer Corps, officers/enlisted); suggested consulting psychologist Dr. Hadley Cantril (Princeton, author of 'The Invasion from Mars,' on the 1938 Orson Welles panic broadcast), plus Don Marquis, Leo Rosten, advertising expert input, Arthur Godfrey as a mass-communication channel, the U.S. Navy Special Devices Center, the Jam Handy Co. (WWII training films), and Walt Disney, Inc. Captain Ruppelt unofficially proposed an expanded ATIC analysis unit (four-officer analyst panel, four investigators, briefing officer, Army liaison officer, weather/balloon data officer, astronomical consultant, group leader with support staff), expected to run 1.5-2 years. UNOFFICIAL INVESTIGATING GROUPS: the Panel noted organizations such as the Civilian Flying Saucer Investigators (Los Angeles) and the Aerial Phenomena Research Organization (Wisconsin) should be watched given their potential mass-psychological influence and possible misuse for subversive purposes. INCREASE IN NUMBER OF SIGHTINGS: Panel consensus, based on historical patterns, that sighting reports could be expected to decrease over time. [PAGE 35] [Withdrawal notice] Access-restricted document, dated 17 Jan 1953, withdrawn from file, located in CIA Job No. [redacted], Box 4, Folder HS/HC-75, per National Security Act of 1947 / CIA Act of 1949 as amended. [PAGES 36-37] Research and Development Board, Washington, 4 November 1952. Memo from Brig. Gen. Alfred R. Maxwell (Air Force Secretariat) to the Chairman, RDB, re: 'Radar Phantoms.' Discusses inquiries to the Air Staff which found no undue concern over radar phantom tracks, given the larger general problem of identifying the vast number of aircraft tracks seen by Air Defense radars; notes the Air Defense Command had been asked to study the problem and make recommendations; states this is an interim report; notes ATIC (which analyzes 'saucer' reports) will emphasize the radar-confusion aspect, and that the subject was becoming more 'respectable' for scientists to study and discuss publicly. Enclosure letter from Walter G. Whitman (RDB Chairman) to Mr. Loftus E. Becker, Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, forwarding the Maxwell memorandum. [PAGES 38-39] 13 October 1952. Memorandum for Deputy Director (Intelligence). SUBJECT: Flying saucers. 1. Unidentified objects have been the subject of Air Force observation and analysis due to the possibility they might represent an actual attack, or that an enemy might exploit the confusion created by saucer reports to mask an actual air attack on the U.S. 2. Defense Department research to date has been confined to A-2/ATIC efforts; explanations have been found for all but 20 percent of approximately 1,500 total reported sightings. 3. OSI's review of existing information does not conclude the saucers are USSR-created or -controlled; effective intelligence collection on Soviet saucer capabilities requires prior fundamental scientific research to clarify the nature and causes of the phenomena and devise identification means. 4. Major scientific intelligence questions: (a) present Soviet knowledge of the phenomena; (b) possible Soviet capability to exploit the phenomena against U.S. security interests; (c) effect of flying saucers on U.S. early-warning systems. 5. Conclusions: (a) instigating fundamental scientific research is primarily the Defense Department's responsibility; (b) the DCI should dispatch a letter to Secretary [Robert] Lovett along the lines of an attached draft; (c) it is far too early, given the present state of knowledge, for psychological warfare planners to consider how the U.S. might use 'flying saucers' as a weapon; (d) once intelligence has submitted a National Estimate on Flying Saucers, there will be a basis for public policy to reduce mass hysteria. Signed James Q. Reber, Assistant Director, Intelligence Coordination. [PAGE 40] Intelligence Advisory Committee memo, 'Unidentified Objects (Flying Saucers)': attaches a proposed letter to Secretary Lovett from the DCI recommending initiation of fundamental scientific research into UFOs; recommends the IAC concur in the proposed letter, and that the Watch Committee give close attention to indications that foreign actions are being taken with respect to, or on the basis of, awareness of Flying Saucers, or with respect to U.S. public opinion on the subject. [PAGE 41] DRAFT LETTER -- Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, re: Unidentified Flying Objects. 1. The IAC has reviewed the current situation concerning UFOs, which have caused extensive speculation in the press and concern to Government organizations; the Air Force has thus far carried the full responsibility for investigating and analyzing individual sighting reports. Since 1947, approximately 1,500 official sighting reports have been received, of which about 20% remain unexplained. 2. This situation may have implications for national security regarding U.S. vulnerability to air attack; intelligence cannot fully discharge its responsibility to assess an enemy's capability to create/use such phenomena against the U.S. without first determining, through scientific research, whether such phenomena can in fact be generated and controlled. 3. Recommends the Department of Defense undertake an expanded scientific research program to reveal the nature of the phenomena causing these sightings and develop means for immediate identification, with close cooperation between the research effort and scientific/technical intelligence agencies, which are prepared to do their part. [PAGE 42] [Second withdrawal notice] Access-restricted document, dated 17 Jan 53, withdrawn from file, located in CIA Job No. [redacted], Box [redacted], Folder HS/HC-75, per National Security Act of 1947 / CIA Act of 1949 as amended.